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 Non-Technical Summary 
In this paper, the forecasting quality and the driving forces of Germany’s medium-
term financial planning (“mittelfristige Finanzplanung” – “Mifrifi”) are assessed. 
While medium-term budgetary planning has become obligatory for EU member 
countries through the surveillance procedures of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact, multi-annual budget plans have a much longer tradition 
in some EU member countries. In Germany, the medium-term financial planning 
was introduced at the end of the sixties. Since then, established by the Stabilitäts- 
und Wachstumsgesetz  of 1967, the Bund gives a projection of fiscal developments 
extending four years into the future beyond the current budget year. 
The resulting time series of budgetary projections offer a rich data set which enables 
the evaluation of the forecasting quality of medium-term fiscal planning in Germany 
and the identification of the driving economic and political factors behind these 
projections. Furthermore, it facilitates the search for the impact the Maastricht fiscal 
surveillance procedures had on pre-existing medium-term planning instruments in 
an important EMU member country. 
A first unambiguous result from the analysis is that the German Bund’s medium-
term financial planning has so far failed to reach its normative objective. Mifrifi has 
not been very effective in making budgetary policy more predictable. The 
projections are heavily biased towards over-optimism. The nineties even have a 
more severe problem: Beyond the budgetary year for which a draft budget exists, the 
financial plan practically loses any value as a forecasting instrument, for horizons 
beyond t+1 there is no longer a systematic link between forecasts and realizations. 
The bad forecasting performance of Mifrifi’s projections and particularly the bias 
towards over-optimism does not come as a surprise in light of the political-economic 
and institutional factors discussed above. The financial plan offers a tempting 
opportunity for any government to use the projections in order to depict a bright 
fiscal future. Thus, the empirical results are in line with the presented theoretical 
reasoning on the time-inconsistency of unbiased governmental forecasts. 
Based on an empirical model explaining the officially expected fiscal changes, the 
relevance of different political and institutional factors driving the financial planning 
can be identified. The findings do not support the simple election year hypothesis. 
Hence, the financial plan is not obviously being used as a propaganda tool in the 
context of national election campaigns. This could simply be due to the fact that 
rational voters do not pay attention to official forecasts which are not credible given 
well known governmental incentives. 
However, the results hint towards the financial plan’s use as a tactical national 
instrument in the context of the Maastricht Treaty’s and the Stability Pact’s 
 surveillance instruments. These EU rules’ taking effect has influenced financial 
planning towards the depiction of favourable deficit trends. The Maastricht Treaty 
appears to have transformed Germany’s budgetary planning, not into the direction of 
more credible and binding projections, but rather toward the production of less 
realistic and unduly favourable outlooks.  
A standard policy conclusion in the presence of time-inconsistencies is the creation 
of credible institutions. These findings suggest that it is worthwhile reflecting this 
strategy also in the context of financial planning. If the responsibility for the 
production of the medium term financial planning is transferred towards 
independent institutions there should be chances for better projections.   
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Abstract  
In Germany, the medium-term financial planning (“Mifrifi”) was introduced at the 
end of the sixties. This study scrutinizes the experience of the German Bund with 
more than thirty years of financial planning. In the first step, the paper explores the 
potential normative and political-economic driving forces of fiscal projections. The 
following empirical part evaluates Mifrifi’s forecasting quality with regard to 
expenditures, taxes and deficits. A model is tested relating the forecasted budgetary 
trends to economic, institutional and political-economic factors. The financial 
planning turns out to be ineffective in making budgetary policy more predictable. 
The projections are heavily biased towards over-optimism. The Maastricht Treaty 
appears to have transformed Germany’s budgetary planning not into the direction of 
more credible and binding projections, but rather towards the production of less 
realistic and unduly favourable outlooks. The policy conclusion hints towards an 
independent institution taking over the responsibility for fiscal forecasts. Such an 
institution would not face the government’s inherent problem being unable to 
promise in a credible way the production of unbiased forecasts. 
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1 Introduction 
Medium-term budgetary planning has become obligatory for EU member countries 
through the surveillance procedures of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. On the national level, multi-annual budget plans have a much longer 
tradition in some EU member countries. In Germany, the mittelfristige 
Finanzplanung (medium-term financial planning, “Mifrifi”) was introduced at the 
end of the sixties. Since then, established by the Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz  
of 1967, the Bund gives a projection of fiscal developments extending four years 
into the future beyond the current budget year. 
The resulting time series of budgetary projections offer a rich data set which enables 
the evaluation of the forecasting quality of medium-term fiscal planning in Germany 
and the identification of the driving economic and political factors behind these 
projections. Furthermore, it facilitates the search for the impact the Maastricht fiscal 
surveillance procedures had on pre-existing medium-term planning instruments in 
an important EMU member country.1 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to systematically scrutinise the experience 
of the German Bund with more than thirty years of Mifrifi using statistical and 
econometric approaches. A methodologically related paper is one by Strauch (et al., 
2004) on the quality of budgetary forecasts in Europe in the form of stability and 
convergence programmes since 1991. However, apart from the inclusion of a much 
longer time series, our study is broader with regard to fiscal variables: While Strauch 
et al. (2004) focus exclusively on the budgetary balance we also look at expenditure 
and tax forecasts.  
The following questions guide this paper’s approach: 
– How does the German Bund’s medium-term planning perform in terms of 
forecasting power with regard to expenditures, taxes and the budgetary 
balance? 
– Which objective economic and political-economic factors influence the 
planning? 
– Did the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact with its more 
binding surveillance practices have an identifiable impact on Mifrifi? 
The analysis proceeds in the following way: In section 2 a short description of the 
multi-annual planning procedure is given together with a discussion of both 
normative and positive interpretations for this instrument’s use. Section 3 
                                           
1   For an overview on multi-annual budgetary planning institutions in EU member countries see 
Hallerberg et al. (2001). 
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extensively analyses forecasting quality followed by the identification of the 
projections’ driving forces in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Mifrifi: procedures and potential motivations 
The Stabilitäts- und Wachstumsgesetz (Act on Stability and Growth, § 9) obliges the 
Bund to put the annual budgetary process into a five year planning horizon 
framework. The financial plan is set up by the Federal Ministry of Finance and is 
determined by the government. The plan must be adjusted on an annual basis. 
Adjustments in the course of a year to new fiscally relevant circumstances are not 
being practiced. The five years refer to the budgetary years t to t+4. The financial 
plan is set up in year t together with the draft budget for t+1. For the first year t, it is 
based on a pre-determined and legally binding budget law. Nevertheless, even the 
figures referring to t have a forecasting character since significant deviation from the 
legislated budget are normal in the course of budget execution.  For the second year 
t+1 the projections correspond to the draft budget starting its way through the 
legislative procedures. For the years t+2 through t+4 the projections are entirely 
indicative without posing any binding restrictions on the coming years’ budgetary 
processes.  
The budgetary forecasts over the whole planning period are detailed and include 
specific numbers not only for the sums of the budgetary balance, revenues and 
expenditures but also for numerous sub-components on both sides of the budget.  
Normative motivation 
The normative motivation for Mifrifi in Germany and comparable institutions in 
other countries is as follows (see, e.g., Tarschys, 2002): Multi-annual planning is to 
correct the short-sightedness of the annual budgetary procedure. By forcing the 
budgetary authorities to look at the medium term fiscal consequences of today’s 
decisions, fiscal policy is intended to become more forward-looking and sustainable. 
Measures on the expenditure side with a lagged profile of the financial burden can 
be identified more easily. The same holds for measures on the revenue side which 
may have a “one-shot” or even a “boomerang”-character in the sense that revenue 
increases today are followed by even larger revenue losses in following years. In 
addition, the government’s fiscal path shall become more predictable for tax payers 
and capital markets alike. 
Clearly, these official motivations hint to problems that, with the prospective 
demographic development, are even more relevant today than during the late sixties 
when Mifrifi was first introduced. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear whether Mifrifi 
is properly applied in accordance with this normative point of view.  
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Political-economic motivations: biased projections in equilibrium 
From a political-economic perspective, motivations very different from officially 
proclaimed ones are likely to be relevant for the use and execution of financial 
planning. Under the vote or popularity maximisation assumption, the government 
might be tempted to use non-binding financial planning as a marketing instrument 
for depicting a bright fiscal future in order to gain political support. Information 
asymmetries between the government and voters on the fiscal future do clearly exist. 
The consequence is that the government has a certain leeway to cheat voters about 
the country’s fiscal future. In line with the insights on voting cycles, a particularly 
optimistic assessment of the budgetary future is to be expected before an election. 
Even if rational voters understand these incentives and regard fiscal projections as 
biased this will not solve the problem: Unbiased fiscal forecasts are not time-
consistent as long as fiscal projections have an impact on the government’s 
popularity. Rational voters will then suspect a bias and thus, the government must 
react to this by giving over-optimistic projections. The resulting equilibrium implies 
distorted forecasts whose degree of bias is correctly assessed by rational voters. As a 
standard in this kind of reasoning, the time-inconsistency problem can only be 
overcome by handing the fiscal forecasts over to an independent third party. Only 
then the bias incentive can be overcome in a reliable way and the projections 
credibility be established. 
Partisan approaches: preparing the field for government expansion/contraction 
Partisan approaches hint to another possible mechanism. The government might use 
financial projections as a strategic tool to influence budgetary processes according to 
its ideological view on the future of the government. A left-wing government with a 
preference for the expansion of the government-sector may consciously depict a 
particularly optimistic picture about the future of public finance. By doing so it 
might hope to convince the public that a present expansion can be financed. A right-
wing government with contrary preferences should use the projections in the 
opposite way: By depicting a particularly gloomy picture of the fiscal future it may 
try to lobby for budgetary cuts. In combination with the rational voter assumption 
similar equilibria would emerge as discussed in the preceding paragraph. In these 
equilibria, rational voters would anticipate the degree of bias correctly but, 
nevertheless, it would not be time-consistent for the government to produce 
unbiased projections. 
Impact of Maastricht 
With the Maastricht Treaty becoming effective on November the 1st, 1993, and the 
strengthening of the fiscal surveillance through the Stability and Growth Pact 
adopted in 1997, national medium-term financial planning is being executed within 
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a European framework. An important part of this surveillance is the presentation of 
national convergence or stability programmes which have a forecast horizon up to 
the year t+3.  
From the national perspective, the character of pre-existing non-binding planning 
instruments, like the German Mifrifi, has been transformed by the Maastricht 
decisions. The budgetary forecasts - at least with regard to deficit projections - are 
no longer of a purely indicative nature. The quality and credibility of these forecasts 
matter for the assessment of whether a country has an excessive deficit or not and 
thus whether sanctions (no EMU entry before a country becomes an EMU member, 
sanctions of the Stability and Growth pact afterwards) are being applied. 
It can be argued that this transformation creates new incentives towards over-
optimistic forecasts. In addition to the assessment of the current situation, the deficit 
perspective is an important evaluation criterion on which a member country being 
threatened by sanctions could try to defend itself by presenting excessively 
favourable outlooks. 
3 The forecasting power of Mifrifi’s projections 
The first step of the empirical strategy, which looks for the true driving forces 
behind Germany’s medium term budgetary plans, is to check these plans’ 
forecasting accuracy. Mifrifi can only serve its official purpose to overcome short-
sightedness and to make fiscal policy more predictable if the projections have a 
minimum degree of forecasting power. 
Figures 1-3 depict GDP-shares for realizations and Mifrifi forecasts (all horizons) of 
deficit, expenditures and taxes.  
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Figure 1: Mifrifi’s deficit forecasts and realizations (GDP shares) 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
realization forecast t
 
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
.030
.035
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
realization forecast t-1
 
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
.030
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
realization forecast t-2
 
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
.030
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
realization forecast t-3
 
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
.030
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
realization forecast t-4
 
 
6 
Figure 2: Mifrifi’s expenditure forecasts and realizations (GDP shares) 
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Figure 3: Mifrifi’s tax forecasts and realizations (GDP shares) 
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The visual inspection reveals the expected divergence between realizations and 
forecasts which increases with the forecast horizon. This property could simply 
reflect the growing uncertainty and does on its own not speak against the forecasts’ 
quality. Furthermore, there are visible impacts originating both from the first oil 
shock in the years 1973/74 and German unification. The oil shock induced a marked 
divergence between deficits realized and forecasted in the years 1975/76. German 
unification had a recognizable impact on the forecast error of taxes and expenditures 
in the early nineties which both materialized on substantially larger levels than 
forecasted in the years before.  
The deficit series indicate a systematic bias towards over-optimism, which becomes 
particularly pronounced with regard to the long forecast horizons. Bad surprises are 
the rule, good surprises the rare exception: For the forecast horizon t+4, out of 32 
yearly observations only 4 (1973, 1989, 2000 and 2001) show the deficit level 
materialized on a level lower than expected. It is worth stressing that deficit forecast 
errors related to the first couple of years of German unification are not outstanding 
in a long-run perspective. Over-optimism also characterizes the forecasts for tax 
revenues while the expenditure series appears less biased: Apart from the surprises 
associated with unification there is no visually recognizable systematic gap between 
forecasts and realizations.  
In the following, more formal measures of forecast quality are presented: the mean 
error (ME), the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), and Theil’s U which is defined 
as the ratio between the forecast’s RMSE and the RMSE of a benchmark forecast. 
Here, the naïve forecast which is the forecasted variable’s last realization is used as a 
benchmark. Each of these measures reveals specific aspects of forecast quality: The 
ME illustrates the sign and the extent of the forecast’s long-run bias whereas the 
RMSE is a better measure for the degree of uncertainty. Theil’s U is helpful because 
its absolute value is easily interpretable: A number below one shows that the 
financial plan’s forecasts are without any additional value compared to the naïve 
forecast which is the last available realization. 
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Table 1: Forecast accuracy Mifrifi’s deficit projections 1968-2003 
 forecast horizon 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
deficit-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0008 0.0003 0.0021 0.0040 0.0061 
RMSE 0.0036 0.0054 0.0059 0.0069 0.0083 
Theil's U 0.63 0.75 0.79 0.78 0.89 
expenditure-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0009 0.0012 0.0032 0.0048 0.0061 
RMSE 0.0022 0.0061 0.0092 0.0125 0.0154 
Theil's U 0.32 0.69 1.01 1.16 1.29 
tax-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0032 -0.0047 
RMSE 0.0033 0.0050 0.0084 0.0120 0.0154 
Theil's U 0.78 0.86 1.16 1.54 1.85 
 
For the whole period 1968-2003 (table 1) the mean errors reveal that biases become 
substantial from the t+2 period onwards, i.e. as soon as the forecast horizon shifts 
beyond the last available draft budget. Both uncertainty (measured by the RMSE) 
and bias (measured by the ME) increase with the forecast horizon. The deficit-GDP-
ratio tends to materialize 0.6 percentage points higher than forecasted with a four 
year horizon. Theil’s U indicates that Mifrifi’s forecasts are worthless for 
expenditures and taxes from the t+2 horizon onwards. In these cases the last 
realization is a better predictor than the financial plan’s figures. 
The calculations based on the whole sample period obscures differences between 
subperiods. Tables 2-4 separately indicate the financial plan’s forecast quality in the 
seventies, eighties and the post-unification years. 
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Table 2: Forecast accuracy Mifrifi’s deficit projections 1968-1980 
 forecast horizon 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
deficit-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0018 -0.0010 0.0019 0.0046 0.0072 
RMSE 0.0038 0.0062 0.0075 0.0095 0.0107 
Theil's U 0.54 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.69 
expenditure-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0010 0.0000 0.0025 0.0055 0.0084 
RMSE 0.0023 0.0031 0.0053 0.0089 0.0122 
Theil's U 0.40 0.37 0.64 0.91 1.08 
tax-GDP-ratio 
ME 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0008 
RMSE 0.0041 0.0060 0.0080 0.0102 0.0127 
Theil's U 0.95 1.20 1.49 1.97 1.95 
 
Table 3: Forecast accuracy Mifrifi’s deficit projections 1980-1990 
 forecast horizon 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
deficit-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0009 0.0010 0.0011 0.0024 0.0047 
RMSE 0.0026 0.0041 0.0043 0.0042 0.0057 
Theil's U 0.53 0.85 0.78 0.66 0.82 
expenditure-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0007 0.0028 0.0028 0.0025 0.0018 
RMSE 0.0016 0.0098 0.0109 0.0116 0.0113 
Theil's U 0.19 1.05 1.11 1.02 0.96 
tax-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0059 -0.0099 
RMSE 0.0026 0.0041 0.0065 0.0089 0.0120 
Theil's U 0.86 1.34 1.46 1.72 1.88 
 
Table 4: Forecast accuracy Mifrifi’s deficit projections 1990-2003 
 forecast horizon 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
deficit-GDP-ratio 
ME 0.0003 0.0010 0.0026 0.0047 0.0069 
RMSE 0.0038 0.0053 0.0052 0.0061 0.0082 
Theil's U 0.76 0.99 1.26 0.98 1.59 
expenditure-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0007 0.0030 0.0060 0.0083 0.0101 
RMSE 0.0023 0.0090 0.0132 0.0174 0.0208 
Theil's U 0.25 0.87 1.31 1.52 1.68 
tax-GDP-ratio 
ME -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0027 
RMSE 0.0031 0.0047 0.0097 0.0146 0.0182 
Theil's U 0.68 0.63 1.04 1.44 1.80 
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For all sub-periods Mifrifi’s forecasts tend to be too optimistic in the sense that 
deficits and expenditures materialize on higher levels and taxes on lower levels than 
expected. The extent of over-optimism differs. In the eighties, mean deficit and 
expenditure errors are substantially smaller compared to the seventies and nineties. 
The reverse holds for taxes where the eighties were a decade of particularly large 
forecast errors. 
Judging on the basis of Theil’s U, the financial plan performs the worst for taxes 
where beyond the horizon on t+1 the naïve forecast beats the financial plan for every 
sub-period. For expenditures, the official forecasts were of some informational 
content before 1980 but for the most part lost this property afterwards. In regard to 
deficits, there are substantial differences between sub-periods: While up to 1990 the 
financial plan beats the naïve forecast even at the longest forecasting horizon of t+4 
this changes after 1990. In the years following 1990 the official deficit forecast is 
almost completely worthless: Even for the draft budget’s forecasting horizon t+1 the 
last realization of the deficit is a better predictor than the financial plan’s figures. 
Thus, the years following German unification, which also are the years under the 
new Maastricht fiscal rules, bring about a dramatic deterioration of deficit forecast 
quality. 
More formal tests confirm both the poor forecasting power and the bias of the 
Bund’s financial planning. The null hypothesis of an unbiased forecast can be tested 
with the help of equation (1): 
(1)    t t tR F uα β= + +  
with Rt representing a variable’s realization in period t and Ft the forecast relating to 
period t, and ut being the error term. Unbiasedness implies (α,β) = (0,1). Tables 5-7 
summarize the results of the corresponding regressions and F-tests for both the 
whole period and two sub-periods (pre- and post-1990).2  
For all three fiscal variables R2 indicates that after 1990 there is almost no link at all 
between forecasted variables and realizations providing even no justification to 
search for any bias in the forecasts. 
For the years before 1990, the regressions have a certain explanatory power which is 
most pronounced for expenditures and weakest for taxes. For deficits and 
expenditures, the F-test reveals an increasing problem with biased forecasts after 
1990. 
                                           
2  Chow-breakpoint tests (not reported) tend to confirm a structural break in equation (1) at the 
year 1990. 
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Overall the bias of forecasts is supported by this approach – in particular with regard 
to the longer-term forecasts: With the exception of expenditures pre-1990 the null of 
unbiasedness has to be rejected for all forecast horizons beyond t+2.  
Table 5: Test for bias, deficit-GDP-ratio 
 α β R2 F-statistic significance 
1968-2003 
t 0.003 (0.001) 0.773 (0.070) 0.78 6.63 0.004 
t+1 0.005 (0.002) 0.670 (0.130) 0.45 3.30 0.050 
t+2 0.060 (0.003) 0.698 (0.209) 0.26 3.40 0.046 
t+3 0.009 (0.003) 0.587 (0.278) 0.13 9.31 0.001 
t+4 0.012 (0.003) 0.388 (0.342) 0.04 21.87 0.000 
1968-1989 
t 0.001 (0.001) 0.826 (0.065) 0.89 7.78 0.004 
t+1 0.003 (0.002) 0.784 (0.152) 0.58 1.03 0.375 
t+2 0.003 (0.004) 0.864 (0.271) 0.36 0.79 0.470 
t+3 0.007 (0.005) 0.703 (0.376) 0.07 2.62 0.100 
t+4 0.008 (0.005) 0.750 (0.469) 0.13 6.59 0.005 
1990-2003 
t 0.010 (0.003) 0.382 (0.186) 0.26 5.58 0.019 
t+1 0.016 (0.003) 0.020 (0.223) 0.00 10.28 0.003 
t+2 0.016 (0.004) -0.009 (0.298) 0.00 9.80 0.003 
t+3 0.015 (0.005) 0.102 (0.415) 0.01 15.49 0.001 
t+4 0.025 (0.004) -1.007 (0.426) 0.32 52.30 0.000 
 
Table 6: Test for bias, expenditure-GDP-ratio 
 α β R2 F-statistic significance 
1968-2003 
t 0.009 (0.004) 0.926 (0.030) 0.96 7.29 0.002 
t+1 0.027 (0.014) 0.805 (0.101) 0.66 2.59 0.090 
t+2 0.056 (0.017) 0.570 (0.125) 0.41 8.07 0.002 
t+3 0.085 (0.017) 0.379 (0.130) 0.21 16.04 0.000 
t+4 0.106 (0.017) 0.227 (0.128) 0.09 24.41 0.000 
1968-1989 
t 0.015 (0.006) 0.888 (0.045) 0.95 7.37 0.004 
t+1 0.010 (0.012) 0.929 (0.089) 0.85 0.32 0.732 
t+2 0.031 (0.016) 0.785 (0.120) 0.70 2.47 0.113 
t+3 0.062 (0.019) 0.566 (0.142) 0.48 6.29 0.009 
t+4 0.090 (0.021) 0.365 (0.154) 0.26 10.55 0.001 
1990-2003 
t 0.007 (0.007) 0.938 (0.055) 0.96 1.35 0.295 
T+1 0.036 (0.036) 0.736 (0.282) 0.36 1.26 0.318 
T+2 0.100 (0.043) 0.239 (0.353) 0.04 4.45 0.036 
t+3 0.152 (0.036) -0.193 (0.300) 0.03 12.00 0.001 
t+4 0.176 (0.028) -0.395 (0.237) 0.19 24.44 0.000 
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Table 7: Test for bias, tax-GDP-ratio 
 α β R2 F-statistic significance 
1968-2003 
t -0.000 (0.006) 0.996 (0.053 0.91 0.62 0.547 
t+1 0.009 (0.009) 0.908 (0.081) 0.79 1.21 0.312 
t+2 0.037 (0.013) 0.643 (0.118) 0.48 5.82 0.007 
t+3 0.067 (0.015) 0.366 (0.131) 0.20 13.66 0.000 
t+4 0.089 (0.014) 0.168 (0.127) 0.06 25.31 0.000 
1968-1989 
t 0.019 (0.011) 0.833 (0.096) 0.79 1.52 0.243 
t+1 0.034 (0.018) 0.695 (0.154) 0.52 2.45 0.110 
t+2 0.073 (0.021) 0.350 (0.182) 0.17 8.73 0.002 
t+3 0.102 (0.021) 0.100 (0.177) 0.02 17.97 0.000 
t+4 0.121 (0.018) -0.065 (0.147) 0.01 36.53 0.000 
1990-2003 
t -0.001 (0.011) 0.999 (0.104) 0.89 1.76 0.214 
t+1 -0.002 (0.021) 1.017 (0.205) 0.67 0.14 0.874 
t+2 0.074 (0.030) 0.259 (0.299) 0.06 3.19 0.077 
t+3 0.125 (0.023) -0.255 (0.228) 0.09 15.46 0.000 
t+4 0.143 (0.016) -0.427 (0.155) 0.39 43.50 0.000 
 
Finally, a less ambitious test of forecasting quality is applied which is related to the 
question on whether a forecast – even when it is associated with large mean errors – 
is at least a good predictor of a variable’s direction of change. Table 8 presents the 
analysis of directional forecasts together with the chi-square test statistic associated 
with the null hypothesis that the forecast has no informational content regarding the 
direction of change (see Diebold and Lopez, 1996, for a description of this test). 
Table 8’s last column strongly supports the finding of over-optimism: decreases of 
deficits and expenditures are forecasted more often and decreases of taxes less often 
than they actually happen. Again, tax forecasts turn out to have the poorest 
properties: For taxes at forecasting horizons t+3 and t+4 more than half of the actual 
declines have come as a surprise. While for deficits and expenditures the share of 
correctly forecasted directions reaches on average more than three quarters, with 
increasing forecast horizons it drops at values of 50 per cent and below for taxes. 
The chi-square-test correspondingly shows that the financial plan does not even have 
an informational content for the trend of tax revenues beyond the draft budget’s 
horizon. The results for deficits and expenditures are more favourable. In spite of the 
bias towards optimism, the forecasts of deficits (all horizons) and expenditures 
(horizons up to t+3) are helpful for assessing the direction of change. 
14 
Table 8: Mifrifi’s directional forecasting power 1968-2003 
 share correct 
predictions of 
direction 
chi-square-
statistic 
significance nb.predicted 
decreases/  
nb. actual 
decreases 
deficit 
t 0.78 11.67 0.001 0.82 
t+1 0.74 10.28 0.001 1.44 
t+2 0.71 8.31 0.004 1.62 
t+3 0.76 10.25 0.001 1.38 
t+4 0.75 10.15 0.001 1.47 
expenditure 
t 0.92 24.08 0.000 1.04 
t+1 0.83 16.15 0.000 1.30 
t+2 0.76 9.95 0.002 1.32 
t+3 0.79 9.91 0.002 1.15 
t+4 0.66 2.26 0.130 1.16 
taxes 
t 0.75 9.97 0.002 0.77 
t+1 0.69 3.73 0.053 0.88 
t+2 0.53 0.40 0.539 0.65 
t+3 0.42 0.00 1.000 0.46 
t+4 0.34 1.15 0.283 0.46 
 
Through the assessment of forecasting quality, three central results emerge: First, a 
bias towards giving too optimistic projections characterizes forecasts of all fiscal 
variables over the whole period. Second, forecast quality is poorest for taxes and, 
third, the nineties are associated with forecast problems particularly regarding 
deficits.  
4 Driving forces of budgetary forecasts 
There are different possible approaches to search for the roots of over-optimism. 
One answer is related to growth errors. Obviously, there is a strong correlation 
between over-optimistic growth projections and fiscal forecast errors. Figure 4 
illustrates the negative correlation between the growth error (calculated as the 
difference between the financial plan’s underlying growth projection in period t and 
the actual realization of the growth rate, time horizon three years) and the deficit 
error. Over-optimism already characterizes the growth projection. For the three year 
forecast horizon the mean error in the growth forecast is -0.68 percentage points. 
Thus, the biased fiscal projections are partly driven by biased growth projections in 
addition to possibly erroneous assumptions in regard to growth elasticities of taxes, 
expenditures and deficits. 
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However, the idea of growth errors as a root of the problem is only one superficial 
answer. Independently, whether over-optimism is more related to growth forecasts 
or to the links between fiscal variables and growth, it exists and needs to be 
explained.  
 
Figure 5: Growth and deficit error, lag 3 
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Therefore, the next analytical step looks deeper into the possible determinants of 
over-optimism and targets the substantiation of some of the factors discussed which 
are associated with political-economic and partisan reasoning and institutional 
changes related to the Maastricht Treaty.  
For this purpose, we test a model for the explanation of the forecasted changes of 
fiscal variables. These forecasted changes are related to the economic and political-
economic characteristics in the year when the forecast was being produced: 
(2)  11 1 1 1ˆ ˆ( )       (  )    
t i t-
t t t t- t- t ty y c X y y γ y uα β+ − −− = + + − + +   
In equation (2), y stands for the ratio of the fiscal variable (deficit, tax, expenditure) 
to GDP. ˆ t ity
+  is Mifrifi’s forecast in t relating to the period t+i (with i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 
corresponding to the periods covered by the financial plan). The forecasted change 
relative to the last known realization (left hand side) is regressed on a number of 
explanatory variables. The 5 x 1 vector Xt includes the following variables: 
– EDUM: The election dummy is set at one (and zero otherwise) for the years 
where the financial plan is last before a regular election takes place. Note that 
1982 has been coded as zero since the 1983 election following the collapse of 
the Schmidt government was not predictable during the spring of 1982 when 
the financial planning was undertaken. The variable is to reveal whether 
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governments use the financial plan as an election campaign opportunity to 
depict a bright fiscal future. 
– PMDUM: The post-Maastricht dummy is set at one from 1994 onwards since 
1994 was the first financial planning after the Maastricht Treaty took effect on 
the 1st of November, 1993. 
– UNIFD: The unification dummy is set at one for the years 1990 to 1993 in 
order to control for the fiscal reactions to unification which could have 
impacted the projected fiscal changes in these years. 
– CDUD: The dummy CDUD is set at one for the years 1983-1998 when the 
financial planning occurred under a government led by the conservative 
Christian Democrats and at zero for the other years with governments led by 
the Socialdemocrats. This variable measures a possible partisan effect. 
– Growth (t-1): The most recent known growth rate is also included to measure 
the impact of the growth situation when the planning takes place.  
Furthermore, the specification allows for a learning effect by including the most 
recent (lag 1) forecasting error 111 ˆ t-t-t- yy −  (FCERRLAG1) among the regressors. In 
order to account for mean reversion processes the forecasted variable’s last realized 
level is included. 
Standard unit root (ADF, Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock) and KPSS stationarity tests show 
that series included can be regarded as stationary so that regression results are not 
spurious. White heteroskedasticity tests did not indicate any divergence from the 
homoscedasticity assumption. However, Breusch-Godfrey Langrange multiplier 
tests (including a maximum number of six lags) hint towards autocorrelated 
residuals for some specifications. In these cases, Newey-West autocorrelation 
consistent estimators are employed (diagnostic tests are not reported).  
Tables 9-11 summarize the results for the regressions all based on the complete 
sample years from 1969-2003. 
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Table 9: Regression results, dependent variable: forecasted change in deficit-GDP-ratio 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Estimation OLS OLS Newey-
West 
Newey-
West 
OLS 
C 0.017 
(0.004)*** 
0.017 
(0.005)*** 
0.012 
(0.003)*** 
0.009 
(0.003)*** 
0.006 
(0.003)** 
UNIFD 0.007 
0.003** 
0.006 
(0.004)* 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002)* 
EDUM -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
PMDUM -0.005 
(0.002)** 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002)* 
-0.003 
(0.002)* 
-0.003 
(0.001)** 
CDUD -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Growth(-1) -0.223 
(0.064)*** 
-0.165 
(0.072)** 
-0.066 
(0.048) 
-0.016 
(0.047) 
0.044 
(0.041) 
FCERRLAG1(-1) -0.121 
(0.327) 
-0.094 
(0.372) 
0.010 
(0.145) 
0.041 
(0.147) 
0.037 
(0.209) 
level deficit-GDP(-1) -0.534 
(0.166)*** 
-0.748 
(0.189)*** 
-0.708 
(0.157)*** 
-0.768 
(0.149)*** 
-0.776 
(0.106)*** 
Nb. observations 35  35 35 35 35 
significance F-test 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 adj. 0.31 0.31 0.54 0.67 0.78 
***/**/*: significance level of 1%/5%/10% 
Table 10: Regression results, dependent variable: forecasted change in tax-GDP-ratio 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Estimation Newey-
West 
Newey-
West 
Newey-
West 
Newey-
West 
Newey-
West 
C 0.023 
(0.009)** 
0.039 
(0.013)*** 
0.029 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.030) 
0.010 
(0.036) 
UNIFD 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.004)** 
0.014 
(0.005)*** 
0.020 
(0.005)*** 
EDUM 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
PMDUM -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.002)** 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
CDUD -0.002 
(0.001)* 
-0.005 
(0.001)*** 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.011 
(0.003)*** 
-0.014 
(0.004)*** 
Growth(-1) 0.040 
(0.031)      
-0.040 
(0.030) 
-0.134 
(0.051)** 
-0.201 
(0.073)** 
-0.257 
(0.090)*** 
FCERRLAG1(-1) 0.145 
(0.168) 
0.205 
(0.333) 
-0.118 
(0.337) 
-0.192 
(0.412) 
-0.072 
(0.436) 
level tax-GDP(-1) -0.215 
(0.079)** 
-0.318 
(0.120)** 
-0.205 
(0.195) 
-0.077 
(0.249) 
0.012 
(0.294) 
Nb. observations 35 35 35 35 35 
sign. F-test 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01 
R2 adj. 0.12 0.17 0.28 0.33 0.35 
***/**/*: significance level of 1%/5%/10% 
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Table 11: Regression results, dependent variable: forecasted change in expenditure-GDP-
ratio 
 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
C 0.068 
(0.021)*** 
0.065 
(0.019)*** 
0.038 
(0.023) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
0.013 
(0.037) 
UNIFD 0.007 
(0.004)* 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
EDUM 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
PMDUM -0.009 
(0.003)*** 
-0.010 
(0.003)*** 
-0.006 
(0.004)* 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
CDUD -0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.002)** 
-0.009 
(0.003)*** 
-0.012 
(0.004)*** 
-0.015 
(0.004)*** 
Growth(-1) -0.148 
(0.061)** 
-0.122 
(0.056)** 
-0.104 
(0.069) 
-0.082 
(0.093) 
-0.056 
(0.108) 
FCERRLAG1(-1) -0.254 
(0.594) 
0.272 
(0.545) 
0.338 
(0.671) 
0.323 
(0.909) 
0.358 
(1.046) 
level exp.-GDP(-1) -0.455 
(0.145)*** 
-0.437 
(0.133)*** 
-0.256 
(0.163) 
-0.188 
(0.221) 
-0.099 
(0.254) 
Nb. observations 35 35 35 35 35 
sign. F-test 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.07 
R2 adj. 0.22 0.34 0.25 0.17 0.19 
***/**/*: significance level of 1%/5%/10% 
 
The deficit regression has the best fit for the model, not only with regard to the 
adjusted R2 but also in the light of RESET specification tests indicating that the 
deficit specification are well specified at least for the time horizons t+2 to t+4. The 
deficit regression’s fit increases with the forecasting horizon. Thus, the significant 
determinants of projected deficit changes are more influential in the longer-run 
horizons. 
The first couple of years of unification show some non-surprising peculiarities in 
projected changes in the sense that for some horizons deficits, taxes and 
expenditures are seen to be affected in a positive way. 
Deficit-GDP-forecasts for the current and the following budgetary year are 0.3 
percentage points lower in election years ceteris paribus. However, this effect is 
insignificant at the 10 per cent level of significance. Insignificance of the election 
year dummy is found for all fiscal variables in all regressions. Alternative 
definitions of the election year dummy (e.g. comparing the last half of a legislative 
period with the first half) did not change this result. 
In contrast to the election year dummy, the post-Maastricht dummy turns out to be 
significant for most of the deficit and expenditure forecast horizons: In the years 
since the Maastricht Treaty took effect, Mifrifi’s projections have become more 
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optimistic in regard to the speed of deficit reduction. This deficit optimism 
associated with the years since 1994 is mainly based on an optimistic projection of 
falling expenditure levels and not on the perspective of rising tax ratios: In the tax 
equation, the Maastricht dummy is only significant for the t+1 horizon. The sign is 
negative which does not correspond to the envisaged deficit reduction. 
There is no indication of a partisan effect in the deficit regressions. Differences 
between forecasted deficit changes produced under social-democratic or christian-
democratic governments are insignificant. However, governments led by the two big 
German parties differ with high significance in almost all specifications for the tax 
and expenditure projections. Financial plans under christian-democratic 
governments tend to project smaller tax and expenditure ratios compared to social-
democratic governments. The missing impact on the deficit projections can be 
interpreted in the following sense: Both political parties announce differing 
objectives for the size of governmental activity which leave their impact on 
expenditure and tax projections. At least in their financial plans, however, 
governments from both sides plan to realize fiscal changes in a financially neutral 
way, i.e. without an impact on the size of the deficit. Therefore, there is no 
indication that deficits projections are used in a tactical way in order to manipulate 
public acceptance for expenditure cuts or increases. 
Smaller past growth rates tend to make financial planning less confident in the sense 
that forecasted deficits and expenditures become larger. However, this consequence 
is not lasting. The longer-run forecast horizons are no longer affected by the recent 
growth experience which hints to one of the deeper causes of the underlying forecast 
bias: A decline in the growth rate is treated by financial planners as a temporary 
phenomenon which has no long-run impact on medium-term forecasts of deficit or 
expenditures. This neglect of the recent growth perspective is most strongly revealed 
in the significant negative sign in the tax regressions where a growth decline leads to 
larger forecasted increases in the tax-GDP-ratio. This is consistent with the view that 
growth slowdowns are always temporal and tax ratios should, therefore, recover. 
The lacking reaction of financial planning to new information is also demonstrated 
by the coefficient of the past forecast error which is insignificant in all regressions. 
No error correction mechanisms seem to exist; past errors do not result in 
recognizable reactions of new forecasts. This result is robust to different 
specifications of the forecast horizon for the error correction variable (not reported). 
Mean reversion as part of the financial planners’ model is strongly supported in the 
deficit regressions where the lagged deficit-GDP-level is highly significant. Large 
current deficits lead to large declines in the projected deficit path. 
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5 Conclusions 
A first unambiguous result from the analysis is that the German Bund’s medium-
term financial planning has so far failed to reach its normative objective. Mifrifi has 
not been very effective in making budgetary policy more predictable. The 
projections are heavily biased towards over-optimism. The nineties even have a 
more severe problem: Beyond the budgetary year for which a draft budget exists, the 
financial plan practically loses any value as a forecasting instrument, for horizons 
beyond t+1 there is no longer a systematic link between forecasts and realizations. 
The bad forecasting performance of Mifrifi’s projections and particularly the bias 
towards over-optimism does not come as a surprise in light of the political-economic 
and institutional factors discussed above. The financial plan offers a tempting 
opportunity for any government to use the projections in order to depict a bright 
fiscal future. Thus, the empirical results are in line with the presented theoretical 
reasoning on the time-inconsistency of unbiased governmental forecasts.  
Nevertheless, our model for the explanation of expected fiscal changes does not 
support the simple election year hypothesis. Hence, the financial plan is not 
obviously being used as a propaganda tool in the context of national election 
campaigns. This could simply be due to the fact that rational voters do not pay 
attention to official forecasts which are not credible given well known governmental 
incentives. 
However, the results hint towards the financial plan’s use as a tactical national 
instrument in the context of the Maastricht Treaty’s and the Stability Pact’s 
surveillance instruments. These EU rules’ taking effect has influenced financial 
planning towards the depiction of favourable deficit trends. The Maastricht Treaty 
appears to have transformed Germany’s budgetary planning, not into the direction of 
more credible and binding projections, but rather toward the production of less 
realistic and unduly favourable outlooks.  
It should be stressed that further research questions are worth addressing: In this 
analysis no particular attention was paid towards the exact channels over which the 
incentives of over-optimism feed into fiscal projections. A bias in budgetary 
forecasts can have two distinct reasons: biased growth projections and/or erroneous 
assumptions about the growth elasticities of taxes, expenditures and deficits. Biased 
growth projections are clearly part of the story but the uncertainty about elasticities 
can be expected to play a relevant role as well.  
A standard policy conclusion in the presence of time-inconsistencies is the creation 
of credible institutions. These findings suggest that it is worthwhile reflecting this 
strategy also in the context of financial planning. If the responsibility for the 
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production of the medium term financial planning is transferred towards 
independent institutions there should be chances for better projections.   
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